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CONSTITUTIONAL I.Aw-FREEDOM OF PRESS-VALIDITY OF MOTION PICTURE 
LICENSING STATUTE-The distributor of the motion picture "Lady Chat-
terley's Lover" applied to the Motion Picture Division of the New York 
State Education Department for a license, required by New York law,1 
for public presentation of the film. The application was denied on the 
ground the film was "immoral"2 within the meaning of the licensing 
statute.3 On review,4 the Board of Regents approved this determination, 
but on appeal the state supreme court reversed the Board.5 A divided court 
of appeals reversed the supreme court,6 holding that the contents of the 
film met the statutory definition of "immoral." On appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, held, reversed. The opinion of the Court7 held 
that the statute was on its face an unconstitutional restraint on free speech, 
since, as interpreted by the state court, the statute required the denial of a 
license to a film simply because it advocated certain ideas, without regard 
to whether it incited to unlawful conduct and without regard to the 
method of portraying these ideas. Three justices,8 concurring in the result, 
after finding that the statute as interpreted by the state court required 
either obscenity or incitement to illegal action as part of the definition of 
"immoral," went on to hold that the statute, constitutional in itself, was 
applied unconstitutionally in this case, since the contents of the film 
were neither obscene nor likely to incite to criminal action and hence not 
within the areas of speech which may be restrained by the states.9 Kings-
ley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State 
of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). 
116 N.Y. Consol. Laws, pt. I (McKinney, 1953) §129. 
2 "The director of the division • • • unless such film • • • is • • • immoral • • • shaII 
issue a license therefor." 16 N.Y. Consol. Laws, pt. I (McKinney, 1953) §122. 
8 " ••• tl;le term 'immoral' ••• shaII denote a motion picture film or part thereof • • . 
which portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdness; or which expressly or 
impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior." 16 
N.Y. Consol. Laws, pt. I (McKinney, Supp. 1959) §122-a. 
416 N.Y. Consol. Laws, pt. 1 (McKinney, 1953) §124 provides for administrative review 
by the defendant Regents. 
6 Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of 
New York, 4 App. Div. (2d) 348, 165 N.Y.S. (2d) 681 (1957). 
6 Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of 
New York, 4 N.Y. (2d) 349, 151 N.E. (2d) 197 (1958). Only three judges held the denial 
of the license under the statute constitutional, Desmond, J., concurring in the result, although 
doubting the validity of the statute, so that a final decision by the United States Supreme 
Court could be obtained. 
7 The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Brennan. 
s Concurring opinion by Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker. 
Principal case at 702. 
9 Several other concurring opinions were written in the case. Justice Frankfurter wrote 
a separate concurring opinion, principal case at 691, in which he stressed the duty of the 
courts, once a licensing statute is found to be within constitutional limits (as he found 
the present statute to be), to accept the responsibility of making a case-by-case finding on 
the constitutionality of its application. Justice Clark concurred separately, principal case 
at 699, on the ground the standard established by the statute was not sufficiently definite 
to serve as a censorship guide. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, concurred sepa• 
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The opm1on of the Court in the principal case marks no significant 
departure from prior free speech doctrine. While speech which incites to 
unlawful conduct10 or is in itself obscene11 is generally regarded as out-
side the protection of the First Amendment, it is equally well recognized that 
the mere advocacy of ideas, albeit unconventional or unpopular, may not 
be restrained.12 Once the Court found that the statute in question placed 
a restraint on speech which advocated an idea in a manner not obscene in 
itself and short of incitement to unlawful conduct, the invalidity of the 
statute followed as a matter of course. It should be noted, however, that 
the ground relied upon by the Court is broader than that previously relied 
upon the Court to invalidate motion picture licensing statutes. Begin-
ning with Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,13 the Court has struck down 
licensing statutes14 on a ground peculiarly fitted to the prior restraint set-
ting, namely, that the statute failed to provide an adequate standard for 
the censor to apply. In the principal case the Court, although citing Bur-
styn as authority, has turned to a broader ground15 equally applicable in 
both prior restraint and subsequent punishment cases. The Court would 
undoubtedly strike down on the same ground a criminal statute punishing 
the same conduct proscribed in the licensing statute under discussion, a 
conclusion which does not necessarily follow where the Burstyn rationale 
is applied.1 6 
Of perhaps greater import to those cities and states which seek to use 
licensing laws in addition to criminal provisions to combat the dissemina-
tion of obscene matter is the opinion of the three concurring justicesi 1 
rately, principal case at 697, on the ground all motion picture censorship is invalid. Justice 
Black concurred individually, principal case at 690, attacking the views of Justice Frank-
furter set out above. 
10 See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 at 321 (1951); Kasper v. Brittain, (6th Cir. 
1957) 245 F. (2d) 92 at 95. 
llSee Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 571 (1942); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
12See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. l at 4 (1949). See also the concurring opinion 
of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 at 376 (1927). 
13 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
14 Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952); Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educa-
tion of Ohio, Division of Film Censorship, and Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of 
University of State of New York, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 
350 U.S. 870 (1955). 
15 Justice Clark, concurring at 699, applied the Burstyn rationale strictly, finding the 
statute as interpreted by the New York courts did not provide an adequate standard for 
the censors. 
16 It may well be that a word or phrase which is not sufficiently definite to provide 
an adequate censorship standard could be sufficiently precise to meet the test that a 
criminal statute which is so vague as to fail to give notice that an act has been made 
criminal before it is done violates due process. See the discussions of the "void for vague-
ness" rule in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 
223 (1951); Roth v. United States, note II supra; Bernard, "Avoidance of Constitutional 
Issues in the United States Supreme Court: Liberties of the First Amendment," 50 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 261 (1951). 
11 See note 8 supra. 
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who took a different view of the New York statute, finding a require-
ment of obscenity or incitement to crime in the statutory definition of 
"immoral." From this concurring opinion, which marks the first de-
parture from the recent summary per curiam disposition of obscenity 
censorship cases,18 two matters stand out: first, states or cities may refuse 
to license a film because of its obscenity, the question of obscenity being 
determined by application of the test of Roth v. United States;19 second, 
it is the function of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court when neces-
sary, to make the determination of obscenity in such cases. The con-
curring justices make it clear that if the licensing statute used obscenity as 
a standard, they would regard the statute as valid.20 This position is re-
inforced by the decision in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,21 approving 
prior restraint on the distribution of obscene literature so long as adequate 
procedural safeguards were maintained. Since the often posed "double 
standard"22 of censorship works to the disadvantage of motion pictures, the 
theory of the Kingsley Books decision would be applied against films as 
well as literature. While it could perhaps be argued that the use of the 
word "obscene" in a licensing statute would be subject to the vagueness 
18 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, (D.C. D.C. 1955) 128 F. Supp. 564, affd. (D.C. 
Cir. 1957) 249 F. (2d) 114, revd. per curiam 355 U.S. 372 (1958), in which the Court, on the 
authority of Roth, note 11 supra and note 19 infra, reversed determinations that certain 
nudist publications could be barred from the mails because of their allegedly obscene 
contents; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, (N.D. Ill. 1956) 139 F. Supp. 837, affd. (7th Cir. 
1957) 244 F. (2d) 432, revd. per curiam 355 U.S. 55 (1958), relying on Alberts v. United 
States, a companion case to Roth, in overruling the denial of a film license under the 
Chicago film obscenity ordinance; One, Inc. v. Oleson, (9th Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d) 772, 
revd. per curiam 355 U.S. 371 (1958), relying on Roth and reversing the denial of an 
injunction against the continued barring from the mails of certain magazines treating 
the topics of homosexuality, lesbianism, and other sexual deviations. None of these per 
curiam decisions discussed constitutional questions, and the summary reversals left un-
clear whether the objection was to the fact of obscenity or the test of obscenity applied in 
the courts below. 
19 " ••• whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." 
Roth v. United States, note 11 supra, at 489. 
20 "I do not understand that the Court would question the constitutionality of the 
particular portions of the statute with which we are here concerned if the Court read, as 
I do, the majority opinions in the Court of Appeals as construing these provisions to re-
quire obscenity or incitement, not just mere abstract expressions of opinion." Concurring 
opinion of Justice Harlan, principal case at 707. 
21 354 U.S. 436 (1957). A majority of the Court, including Justices Frankfurter, Clark, 
Harlan, and Whittaker of the present court, approved New York's statutory procedure 
allowing the issuance of a temporary injunction against the distribution of obscene ma-
terial, where a final decision on the fact of obscenity was to be made by a state court within 
a few days. Justice Brennan, who dissented in the case at 447, did not object to the fact 
of prior restraint, but felt the question of obscenity should be determined by the jury 
rather than the court. 
22 "Nor need we here determine whether, despite problems peculiar to motion pic-
tures, the controls which a State may impose upon this medium of expression are precisely 
coextensive with those allowable for newspapers, books, or individual speech." Opinion 
of the Court, principal case at 689-690. But see Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 
495 at 500-501 (1952). 
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test applied in Burstyn, this is probably not the case.23 The Roth test 
which, although enunciated in a case involving a criminal prosecution, has 
been generally applied in cases of prior restraints on alleged obscenity,24 
provides the standard by which the determination of obscenity must be 
made. But although the same test is to be used in both prior restraint and 
subsequent punishment cases, the question of who is to apply the test may 
now depend on the nature of the restraint. Although Justice Black is alarmed 
at the prospect of the Supreme Court making the application in each case, 
the question having "so little in common with law suits,"25 at least four 
justices20 and perhaps a majority of the Court,27 as well as the lower 
courts,28 consider it essential to the protection of First Amendment rights 
that the determination be made by the courts, with a de novo viewing on 
appeal. Thus, unlike the rule in criminal actions,29 it may be that' the 
Roth "average person" and "community standard" tests will be applied 
by the courts rather than by the juries in prior restraint cases. If the 
Supreme Court now is going to determine the fact of obscenity on its own, 
lower courts may no longer be inclined to hold particular matters not 
obscene -in order to avoid the discussion of constitutional questions and a 
more realistic application of the Roth test may result. 
Dean L. Berry, S.Ed. 
28 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, note 22 supra, where at 505-506 the Court 
states: " ••• it is not necessary for us to decide •.• whether a state may censor motion 
pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of 
obscene films."· See also Roth v. United States, note 11 supra, where the Court discusses 
the vagueness of the term "obscene." Cf. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, note 18 supra. 
24 See, e.g., cases cited in note 18 supra. See also Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 
(S.D. N.Y. 1959) 28 U.S. LAw WEEK 2044; Capital Enterprises, Inc. v. Chicago, (7th Cir. 
1958) 260 F. (2d) 670. Cf. Maryland State Board of Censors v. Times Film Corp., 212 
Md. 454, 129 A. (2d) 833 (1957), decided before Roth. 
25 Justice Black, concurring in the principal case at 691. 
26 See notes 8 and 21 supra. 
27 It may well be that the summary per curiam reversals in the past two years, dis 
cussed in note 18 supra, were based on separate factual findings by the Supreme Court. 
28 See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, note 18 supra; Capital Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Chicago, note 24 supra; Maryland State Board of Censors, note 24 supra; Excelsior Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 3 N.Y. (2d) 237, 144 N.E. 
(2d) 31 (1957). 
29 See Roth v. United States, note 11 supra. But see United States v. Keller, (M.D. 
Pa. 1958) 158 F. Supp. 940, revd. on other grounds (3d Cir. 1958) 259 F. (2d) 54; Cincin• 
nati v. Walton, (Cin. Mun. Ct. 1957) 145 N.E. (2d) 407; Commonwealth v. Moniz, (Mass. 
1959) 155 N.E. (2d) 762. 
